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The primary quantum mechanical equation of motion entails that measurements typically do 
not have determinate outcomes, but result in superpositions of all possible outcomes. 
Dynamical collapse theories (e.g. GRW) supplement this equation with a stochastic Gaussian 
collapse function, intended to collapse the superposition of outcomes into one outcome. But 
the Gaussian collapses are imperfect in a way that leaves the superpositions intact. This is 
the tails problem. There are several ways of making this problem more precise. But many 
authors dismiss the problem without considering the more severe formulations. Here I 
distinguish four distinct tails problems. The first (bare tails problem) and second (structured 
tails problem) exist in the literature. I argue that while the first is a pseudo-problem, the 
second has not been adequately addressed. The third (multiverse tails problem) reformulates 
the second to account for recently discovered dynamical consequences of collapse. Finally 
the fourth (tails problem dilemma) shows that solving the third by replacing the Gaussian 
with a non-Gaussian collapse function introduces new conflict with relativity theory. 
Keywords: Quantum theory; State vector reduction; wave-function collapse; Tails Problem; GRW; 
Measurement Problem 
1. Dynamical Collapse Theories and the Problem of Outcomes 
Quantum mechanics suffers from the measurement problem. There are several ways of stating this 
problem. A useful formulation is the problem of outcomes (Maudlin 1995). Two propositions made 
plausible by quantum mechanics are prima facie incompatible with a third independently plausible 
proposition: 
(A) The wave-function of a system is complete in the sense that the wave-function specifies (directly 
or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system.  
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 This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/13552198). 
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(B) The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation (e.g. the 
Schrödinger equation).  
(C) Measurements always (or at least usually) have single determinate outcomes i.e. at the end of the 
measurement the measuring device indicates a definite physical state.  
Propositions (A)-(C) cannot all be true at once. To illustrate: let the wave-function of a (macroscopic) 
measuring device d be described by |ready>d meaning that d is ready to measure the physical state of 
some particle. Let |0> and |1> describe the distinct values of some two-valued property (e.g. spin); d is 
designed to detect which of these two states a particle is in. If the wave-function for d and particle p is 
initially |ready>d|0>p then switching d on (i.e. performing the measurement) gives |'0'>d|0>p where 
|'0'>d means that d has detected that p is in state |0> (and displays this e.g. using a pointer). Similarly, 
if the initial wave-function is instead |ready>d|1>p then turning the device on gives |'1'>d|1>p. Now let 
the initial wave-function of p be the linear superposition a|0>p + b|1>p such that a and b are nonzero 
and |a|
2
 + |b|
2
 = 1. Then the complete initial wave-function is: 
                        (1)  
The linearity of the dynamics (B) guarantees that if d is switched on then the microscopic 
superposition will be magnified up into the macroscopic object yielding an entangled superposition: 
                          (2)  
Since d only displays three possible states (ready, '0' and '1'), (2) does not represent a single definite 
measurement outcome. Thus, if propositions (A) and (B) are true then (given the kinds of physical 
states that actually obtain) proposition (C) cannot be true. But (C) is extremely plausible: it is 
apparently confirmed by observations of the post-measurement states of measuring devices. This is 
the problem of outcomes.  
Solutions can be categorised in terms of which proposition they reject. Additional variables theories 
(e.g. Bohm (1952)) reject (A): the wave-function is incomplete and definite measurement outcomes 
are determined by additional variables. Orthodox textbook quantum mechanics denies (B): when 
measurement occurs the linear dynamics abruptly stops governing the measured system and the 
system’s wave-function collapses into a definite (non-superposition) state. The probability that the 
wave-function collapses into one of its component states is given by the absolute value squared (mod-
square) of that component's coefficient. The inadequacy of appealing to the vague notion of 
measurement is the traditional formulation of the measurement problem (Albert 1992: chapter 4). 
The theories at issue - dynamical collapse theories - deny (B). Moreover, they solve the measurement 
problem by formulating the collapse process precisely, without reference to 'measurement' or 
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cognates. I will illustrate dynamical collapse theories using the original GRW spontaneous collapse 
theory (Ghirardi et. al. 1986) and the modern matter-density theory (Ghirardi et. al. 1995). The latter 
denies (A) as well as (B), supplementing the wave-function with a matter-density distribution.
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But first it will be worth considering the Everett (or "many-worlds") interpretation,
3
 which denies (C): 
the wave-function is complete and evolves only in accord with the linear equation. (1) and (2) are 
interpreted as a microscopic superposition causing a macroscopic system (d) to bifurcate into two 
distinct devices that report the two possible measurement outcomes. This does not contradict our 
experience because human observer h who is initially ready to observe d's result (|ready>h) will in 
accord with the linear dynamics branch too: 
                                      (3)  
The two separate terms in this superposition will (in realistic scenarios) undergo decoherence thereby 
evolving independently and will thus represent distinct macroscopic worlds within a single quantum 
mechanical multiverse. 
Many-worlds theory is worth mentioning here because, as we shall see, the tails problem (when 
properly formulated) implies that the formalism of dynamical collapse theories describes a multiverse 
of some sort. This undermines collapse theories since their goal is to retain and explain (C) but (C) is 
inconsistent with many-worlds theory. 
 
2. The GRW Theory 
The idea behind the original GRW theory is simple: elementary particles have a tiny probability per 
unit time for spontaneously collapsing into a definite position. Measuring devices are composed of 
many entangled particles and so have an extremely high probability per unit time for collapsing into a 
definite position. In other words, although one isolated particle rarely spontaneously collapses, one 
non-isolated particle will certainly collapse if a particle it is entangled with collapses. GRW postulate 
that particles have a 10
-16
 probability per second for spontaneously collapsing.
4
 Systems composed of 
10
23
 entangled particles will then collapse around 10
7
 times per second. The probability that a given 
wave-function will collapse onto one of its components is given by the mod-square of that 
component's coefficient. This is how GRW recover the probabilistic predictions of textbook quantum 
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 Ghirardi et. al. (1995: sec. 3) motivate the matter-density addition as a solution to the tails problem (see sec. 
5.1 below). Meanwhile Allori et al. (2008: sec. 4.3) motivate the addition as a solution to the problem of the 
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mechanics. Note the two distinct roles played by probability: there is the probability per unit time for 
spontaneous collapse and there is the probability that the collapse will be centred on a given wave-
function component. 
It will be useful to distinguish the idealised GRW theory from the realistic GRW theory. Consider the 
following wave-function of a particle confined to the x-axis: 
                                 (4)  
In the idealised theory this particle has a 10
-16
 probability per second for spontaneously collapsing into 
one of the components. The probability that the particle collapses to component |  > is |ai|
2
. Now 
consider the transition from (1) to (2). In the idealised theory (2) is unstable and will immediately 
collapse into |'0'>d|0>p with probability |a|
2
 or |'1'>d|1>p with probability |b|
2
. This guarantees a definite 
measurement outcome.  
Collapse in the idealised theory reduces all but one of the coefficients to zero, while the mod-square 
of the chosen coefficient goes to one. But this collapse function is unphysical.
5
 This is due to 
position/momentum incompatibility. The more confined the position wave-function the more spread 
out the momentum wave-function. The more spread out the momentum wave-function the more 
equiprobable all possible states of momentum become. The relationship between energy and 
momentum then yields drastic post-collapse violations of energy conservation: ones that we know by 
experiment do not occur. So GRW formulated the collapse function as a Gaussian. The collapse then 
raises the mod-square of the chosen coefficient - the collapse centre - close to one while reducing the 
mod-square of all other coefficients close to zero but never actually to zero. GRW carefully chose the 
probability per unit time for spontaneous collapse and the width of the bell curve of the Gaussian (10
-5
 
meters), so that the energy conservation violations are consistent with known experiments.
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But in formulating the collapse function consistently with experiments, GRW may have undermined 
the theory's ability to explain definite measurement outcomes. We must now redefine what is meant 
by collapse. Collapsing into a wave-function component now means something like "shifting most of 
the mod-square value to that component". Reconsidering the transition from (1) to (2): (2) is unstable 
but there will be no transition to a state represented by one of the components as in the idealised 
theory. Rather, the post-collapse state is: 
                          (5)  
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Where c and d are nonzero, |c|
2
 + |d|
2
 = 1, and either |c|
2
  >> |d|
2
  or |d|
2
 >> |c|
2
. The probability that |c|
2
  
>> |d|
2
 is |a|
2
 while the probability that |d|
2
 >> |c|
2
 is |b|
2
. To analyse the adequacy of this theory we 
must ask whether (5) ultimately makes sense as a description of a definite measurement outcome. 
This theory is often denoted GRW0 to distinguish it from GRWM (the matter-density formulation).
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GRWM defines a three-dimensional matter-density distribution in terms of the wave-function using 
matter-density operators: 
          
      
 
 
 
(6)  
N
(k)
(r) is a particle number operator that gives the number of particles of type k that exist at position r, 
and   is the mass of a particle of type k. The matter-density function at r is then: 
                 
 
(7)  
Here     is the quantum state vector of the universe. As Wallace (2008: 60) puts it, “the [matter] 
density is the sum of the mass-weighted ‘probability’ densities for finding each particle at r; for a one-
particle wavefunction     ,     is just m times |    |2”. The wave-function   therefore determines 
the matter distribution     . Originally the matter-density function was called the mass-density 
function. But as Allori et. al. (2014: 331-2) state: “the matter that we postulate in GRWM and whose 
density is given by the m function does not ipso facto have any such properties as mass or charge; it 
can only assume various levels of density”. 
I discuss the tails problems in the context of both GRW0 and GRWM because these have become the 
most widely discussed collapse theories.
8
 When I refer to GRW (without subscript) I am referring to 
GRW0 and GRWM. Furthermore, the meaning of "collapse centre" will depend on which GRW theory 
is under discussion. In GRW0 "collapse centre" refers to the wave-function component that receives 
the amplitude increase, in GRWM "collapse centre" refers to the associated matter-density. We now 
turn to the tails problems. 
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4. Tails Problem I: The Bare Tails Problem 
The traditional formulation of the tails problem is an inconsistent triad: 
(i) The eigenstate-eigenvalue link (EEL) 
(ii) The wave-function evolves in accord with the GRW dynamics. 
(iii) Measurements have definite outcomes.
9
 
EEL is the traditional interpretive principle of textbook quantum mechanics. It states that a system S 
has a measureable property P when and only when S's quantum state is an eigenstate of P. In other 
words: S has some value of P if and only if S has some value of P with mod-square equal to one. But 
the GRW post-collapse state (5) is not an eigenstate of the property "displaying a single definite 
measurement outcome". That's because neither of the components have mod-square equal to one - one 
of the components is close to one while the other is close to zero. So we appear to have a problem.  
GRW has three options:  
 Deny (i): retain the GRW Gaussian collapse function but revise EEL. 
 Deny (ii): retain EEL but revise the collapse function. 
 Deny (i) & (ii): revise both EEL and the collapse function. 
Denying (i) has been the primary focus of the tails problem literature up until now, and will be 
discussed in a moment. Denying (ii) has not been explored, partly because there is no reason for 
retaining EEL (e.g. neither Bohm nor Everett retains EEL). I will argue that the tails problem 
(properly formulated) forces collapse theorists to deny (i) & (ii). Denying (iii) is not an option because 
explaining (iii) is the primary explanatory goal of collapse theories.  
For simplicity let's focus on EEL applied to particle position: particle p is in region R if and only if the 
proportion of the total value of the mod-square associated with (points in) R is equal to one. How 
should we revise this principle? Since GRW post-collapse states come close to position eigenstates 
perhaps one only needs to relax EEL. This is the influential tactic of Albert and Loewer (1996) who 
postulate the so-called fuzzy-link: 
 Fuzzy-link principle: Particle p is in region R if and only if the proportion of the total 
 mod-square value of p's quantum state associated with points in R is greater than 1-q. 
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Assuming this principle, it doesn't matter that (5) is not an eigenstate of the property "displaying a 
single definite measurement outcome". What matters is that there is some structure postulated by 
GRW, which is a suitable supervenience base for such a measurement outcome, and which is assigned 
mod-square value greater than 1-q. So problem solved: definite measurement outcomes are 
guaranteed by GRW's post-collapse states.  
GRWM also appeals to the fuzzy-link. It just needs to be made clear that particle p does not supervene 
on any aspect of p's wave-function, but on the matter-density associated with the component of the 
particle's wave-function whose mod-square value is greater than 1-q.  
According to Albert and Loewer the value of q is defined to ensure that what we take to (not) be 
determinate is (not) determinate. However, a small continuum of q-values will yield this result equally 
well. The value of q cannot be narrowed down any further by experiment. After all, q is not a 
fundamental constant, so given an initial quantum state and the GRW dynamics, different hypotheses 
about the exact value of q will not lead to different future quantum states.
10
 For Albert and Loewer 
this is unsurprising given the metaphysical status of the fuzzy-link. They say that it "is a new 
proposal, an alternative proposal, about the relation between position-talk and quantum-talk; a new 
proposed supervenience rule" (1996: p87).  Others have described it as "a proposal for how to use 
language" (Lewis: 2006).  
Exactly how localised a wave-function needs to be for it to determine a localised particle is not well-
defined due to q being indeterminate. But for Albert and Loewer this kind of "vague supervenience" is 
nothing new: macroscopic objects vaguely supervene on microphysical particles (just as they always 
have) while microphysical particles (now) vaguely supervene on wave-functions (in GRW0) and on 
matter-density distributions (in GRWM). The problem looks solved. But there are more severe 
formulations the tails problem. 
 
5. Tails Problem II: The Structured Tails Problem 
An alternative statement of the tails problem was first formulated by Cordero (1999): 
"In my view, it cannot be a disturbing aspect of the GRW theory […] that it fails to preserve a 
(really mythical) value-eigenvalue link of standard quantum theory [...] There seem to be 
some relevant objections to the approach, however [...] the GRW approach smuggles into the 
theory too many of the conceptual peculiarities of the "many decohering worlds" approach." 
(1999: 65) 
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This has been developed by Wallace (2008) who distinguishes the bare tails problem from what he 
calls the structured tails problem. Wallace formulates the latter as follows: 
 "If the [fuzzy-link is] just a matter of descriptive convenience then what prevents us 
 regarding observers as being just as present in the dead-cat term as in the live-cat term? 
 After all [...] the dead-cat term is as rich in complex structure as the live-cat term [...] taken 
 to its logical conclusion, this seems to suggest that the GRW theory [...] is just as much a 
 'many-worlds' theory as the Everett interpretation." (2008: 63) 
Cordero (1999: 67) emphasises that GRWM does not escape this objection. Recall equations (6) and 
(7); the matter-density function effectively defines the tails into the ontology with the important 
caveat that low mod-square densities are less dense. The GRWM fuzzy-link states that a particle exists 
at a region if there is enough matter at that region. But whatever the non-zero density of the tails, they 
are still structurally isomorphic to the collapse centre. 
I formulate the structured tails problem in terms of a conditional whose antecedent GRW must accept, 
before drawing the "Everett-in-disguise" moral from the consequent. This ensures that the formulation 
does not presuppose the Everett interpretation (or any of its interpretive principles). Recall that 
"collapse centre" refers to the randomly chosen wave-function component (in GRW0) or the 
associated matter-density (in GRWM). Similarly "tails" will refer to the tails of the wave-function (in 
GRW0) or to the tails of the associated matter-density distribution (in GRWM). 
 The Structured Tails Problem: If the collapse centre structure determines a particle 
 configuration, then so do the structures in the tails. This is because the tails and the collapse 
 centre are structurally isomorphic (or at least relevantly structurally similar). Nothing 
 about low mod-square value can suppress this isomorphic structure. The consequence is an 
 Everettian many-worlds ontology. 
To illustrate consider (5). But note that the way we wrote (5) begs the question against GRW. In 
particular GRW should deny that the terms |'1'>d and |'0'>d are a legitimate way to summarise the post-
collapse wave-function. Writing the wave-function down in neutral terms gives: 
                                      (8)  
[0-state] is a complicated wave-function component structured so that if localised particles supervene 
on it (or its associated matter-density) then there are particles composing a measuring device 
displaying a 0-outcome. 
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[1-state] is an equally complicated wave-function component structured so that if localised particles 
supervene on it (or its associated matter-density) then there are particles composing a measuring 
device displaying a 1-outcome.  
The central problem is that GRW tells us that only the collapse centre determines macroscopic objects 
without telling us why. It is not enough to say that high mod-square as opposed to low mod-square 
makes the difference. The theory must say why high mod-square values have this property. Otherwise 
there is a substantive explanatory hole in the theory reminiscent of the unexplained role of 
'measurement' in textbook quantum mechanics. So given the structured tails problem it is unclear why 
GRW is an improvement on textbook quantum mechanics.  
Albert and Loewer's idea of vague supervenience does not solve this problem. One cannot explain 
why our term "measuring device" picks out the high mod-square structure by asserting that 
"measuring device" is vague. The question is what our term "measuring device" ought to refer to 
given the fundamental description of reality given by GRW. And the argument here is that if the term 
refers to the high mod-square structure then it ought to refer to the low mod-square structure too for 
the sake of consistency: the two structures are isomorphic and nothing about mod-square value breaks 
the structural symmetry. 
An analogy will help to press this point. The Everett interpretation suffers a similar explanatory 
problem: the problem of explaining why mod-square values are probabilities (Albert 2010). Thus, just 
as GRW has a problem explaining why high mod-square values are macro-existence determiners, 
Everettians have a problem explaining why high mod-square values are high probabilities. But there is 
a difference: Everettians admit this problem in the sense that they do not simply stipulate that high 
mod-square values are high probabilities as a matter of linguistic fiat. On the contrary, an enormous 
amount of work spanning decision theory and probability theory has gone into providing a solution 
(Saunders et. al. (2010), Wallace (2012)). The analogous problem in GRW is not typically addressed 
in this way as it is often said that the connection between high mod-square value and macro-existence 
can just be stipulated as a part of the GRW theory (e.g. via the fuzzy-link principle).  
Not all GRW-advocates settle for the ad hoc stipulation. In fact there are a bewildering variety of 
responses without any apparent consensus on which is correct. Let us then consider some 
paradigmatic responses and consider whether they have responded specifically to the structured tails 
problem.  
5.1 Clifton and Monton's response 
Since mod-square values are probabilities, perhaps the solution is to analyse the concept of existence 
in terms of probability. Such a view is suggested by Clifton and Monton: 
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“If one is willing to entertain the thought that events in a quantum world can happen without 
being mandated or made overwhelmingly likely by the wavefunction, then it is no longer 
clear why one should need to solve the measurement problem by collapsing wavefunctions! 
[...] ...one supposes there to be a plausible intuitive connection between an event’s having a 
high probability according to a theory, and the event actually occurring”. 
(Clifton and Monton 1999: 708 [My Italics]) 
Clifton and Monton motivate this view with the assertion that the connection between high probability 
and existence is “plausible”, “intuitive”, and “natural”, and with the assertion that without this 
connection, collapse theories fail (Clifton and Monton 2000: 155).  
Wallace (2008: 59) argues that Clifton and Monton confuse the role of probability in collapse 
theories. The mod-square of a superposition component is the objective probability for that 
component to become a collapse centre. It is not the objective probability for that component to have 
‘actually occurring’ status. On a realist view of GRW0 the entire wave-function exists (simpliciter) 
and on a realist view of GRWM the entire matter-density exists, including low-density tails.  
Clifton and Monton could postulate that mod-square plays a further role beyond what GRW intended. 
This postulate would relate the existence of what composes macro-objects with mod-square values 
such that existence comes in degrees and there are borderline cases of whether or not something 
exists. In GRWM the mass-density would fade out of existence as its associated value drops below 1-
q. And as the associated value goes above 1-q a higher level of existence (as well as density) is 
exemplified. Such a theory might conceivably be true. But much more work is needed to make sense 
of the idea of indeterminate existence, and to develop the theory more generally.
11
  
5.2 Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti's response 
After introducing GRWM, Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti (1995) address the structured tails problem for 
GRWM with a further principle designed to define away the matter-density tails. They define the low-
density matter in the tails as “inaccessible” (i.e. observers cannot directly measure it) and so “not 
objective”. A problem with this response is described by Tumulka (2011: 6): 
 "[The tails problem] is whether GRW theories give rise to unambiguous facts about the 
 aliveness of Schrödinger's cat or the location of the marble [...] Such a worry cannot be 
 answered by describing what an observer can or cannot measure. Instead, I think, the answer 
 can only lie in what the ontology is like, not in what observers see of it." 
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 In an attempt to solve the Everettian probability problem, Vaidman (1998: 256) introduces the concept of 
the measure of existence of a world as a basis for introducing (an illusion of) probability. 
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Here is another problem: Ghirardi et al. cannot (without circularity) appeal to observers until they've 
solved the structured tails problem. After all, the observers in the tails can access the matter in the 
tails. So what's accessible to observers can only be defined by this theory after the structured tails 
problem has been solved. The fact that the observers in the collapse centre cannot access the matter-
density in the tails does not appear to speak to the real tails problem.
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5.3 Tumulka's and Albert's responses 
Tumulka (2011) defends GRWM against several objections that he thinks applies to GRW0. He 
identifies the tails problem with the bare tails problem (see his sec. 3) but nonetheless offers a 
response to the structured tails problem in his discussion of Ghirardi et. al.'s idea of accessibility (sec. 
5). Tumulka offers an argument by analogy. The analogy involves a marble in a box. The marble is 
associated with a wave-function with high mod-square value inside the box and a small patch outside 
the box. The question is whether the marble is in the box. Here is the argument: 
 "[I]t is a fact for the matter-density ontology that the fraction |c2|
2
 << 1 of the marble's matter 
 lies outside the box - a fact that does not contradict the claim that the marble is inside the  box, 
 as can be illustrated by noting that anyway, for thermodynamics reasons, the marble 
 creates a vapor out of some of its atoms (with low partial pressure), an effect typically 
 outweighing |c2|
2
. The state of the primitive ontology in which the overwhelming majority of 
 matter is inside the box justifies saying that the marble is inside the box. Thus, the primitive 
 ontology does provide a picture of reality that conforms with our everyday intuition." 
The problem with this argument is that it only asks us to consider our everyday intuition regarding an 
extremely simple system. This is misleading. Our formulation of the structured tails problem requires 
that we consult our intuitions regarding more complex environments. For example, let 
                           (9)  
be the expression for d being ready to measure whether p is inside or outside the box such that |a|
2
 >> 
|b|
2
. According to the GRW dynamics the subsequent state is probably: 
                                (10)  
We need (10) to bring out the concern about the low mod-square component. For GRWM the 
component          means that there is a configuration of low-density matter that at least resembles 
a device indicating 'out' in its shape, dynamics, and function. Can we intuit this matter configuration 
as nothing more than small unimportant "bits" that are hanging off of the device that indicates 'in'? 
Imagine that the measuring device indicates an outcome using a pointer. How can the pointer pointing 
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to 'in', have an array of parts (analogous to the vapour) that form the shape of a pointer pointing to 
'out'? This does not seem intelligible. 
Maudlin (2010: 135-6) makes a similar point: "the low-density apparatus seems to have the same 
credentials to be a full-fledged macroscopic object as the high-density apparatus since the density per 
se does not affect the structural or functional properties of the object." Albert (2014: XX) has recently 
responded that this is "vividly and radically mistaken", that more careful analysis shows that low-
density matter behaves quite differently, and that "once this is taken on board, there immediately 
ceases to be any such thing as a 'problem' about the tails".  
Albert considers a billiard ball (ball 1) in a superposition of travelling to point P and travelling to 
point Q from the left, and another (ball 2) that is in a superposition of travelling to point P and 
travelling to point Q from the right. Prior to collision we have: 
                                      (11)  
Where |a|
2
  >> |b|
2
. After collision we have: 
                
              
                           
(12)  
Where              is the high density component in which two billiard balls, after a 
direction-of-motion reversing collision, are travelling away from P. Presumably if this component 
determines a post-collision state, then so does the    component (while the remaining two determine 
situations in which collision was avoided). But Albert makes a distinction between the high-density 
sector and the low-density sector. In the high-density sector we have a familiar type of collision... 
 "But look at the low-density sector: what happens there is that two balls converge at Q and 
 pass right through one another - and (in the meantime) two new balls appear, which then 
 recede, in opposite directions, from P." (XX) 
The implication is that high-density matter and only high-density matter has the structural and 
functional credentials to count as genuine macroscopic stuff.  
The problem with this response is that the distinction between high and low density sectors is not fine-
grained enough. If there were no reason to distinguish between distinct low-density sectors then 
Albert's conclusion follows and the problem is solved. But consider how Albert characterises low-
density objects: "What are they? Call them (I don't know) ghosts" (XX). Presumably "ghosts" is an 
apt description since distinguishable objects seem to be moving right through each other. Such objects 
are moving right through the high-density sector (and vice versa) too. Decoherence entails that in 
realistic circumstances there must be distinguishable sectors within the low-density sector, which are 
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(to varying degrees) dynamically isolated from each other (despite overlapping in space). It is 
precisely this dynamic isolation that enables us to distinguish different low-density sectors. And as 
soon as we make such distinctions we immediately rediscover our structured tails, and the tails 
problem returns in earnest.  
5.4 Monton's and Chalmers' responses 
Monton (2004) responds to the problem of low-density tails (in GRWM) by postulating 
psychophysical principles: 
“a certain assumption about psychophysical parallelism needs to be made. But the assumption 
is a reasonable one. [...] There is no reason to suppose that mental states supervene just on 
particle location; instead we can suppose that mental states supervene on the distribution of 
mass [matter]. Since the masses of particles in a brain are concentrated in the appropriate 
regions of space, it is reasonable to assume that the appropriate mental states supervene on 
those mass concentrations.” (2004: 418) 
 
The idea is that mental states supervene, not only on the configurations of matter-density in space-
time, but also on the denseness of those configurations. And so because the matter-density tail that 
appears to compose a measuring device (pointing to 'out') and an observer (recording that result) has 
low-density, there are no experiences as of a measuring device (pointing to 'out'). That's because 
mental states require a brain-like structure to have sufficiently high matter-density. But on the face of 
it this doesn't help: we are left with tails containing objects that (other than being “low in density”) are 
structurally isomorphic to humans but are unconscious. This is not an acceptable theory.  
To avoid what might be called "zombie tails", one might supplement Monton's suggestion with an 
analysis of physical concepts such that their correct application to physical properties is partly 
determined by what experiences those physical properties induce in us. This option is explored by 
Chalmers (2012): 
“In the case of macroscopic spatial properties, it is plausible that spatial properties can be 
picked out by spatial concepts as that manifold of properties that serve as the causal basis for 
spatial experience [...] To simplify, the property of being two meters away from one might be 
picked out as the spatial relation that normally brings about the experience of being two 
meters away from one. [...] One can then argue that on a collapse interpretation, the properties 
and relations that normally bring about the relevant sort of spatial experiences are precisely 
properties and relations requiring the wavefunction’s amplitude to be largely concentrated in 
a certain area." (2012: 295-296) 
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Combining this phenomenal analysis of physical concepts with Monton's psychophysical metaphysics 
removes the structured tails. For if low-density matter is never a causal basis for experiences of 
physical properties, then physical concepts do not apply to low-density matter. If we consider the 
marble in the box, the matter outside the box does not cause any experiences, only the matter inside 
the box does, and so 'marble' must refer only to what is inside the box. (Isolated particles cannot cause 
experiences, but they still have the type of property that cause the relevant experiences (high-density), 
which is all the phenomenal analysis needs to licence application of physical concepts to isolated 
particles.)  
One problem with this proposal is that it is simply defining the problem away. Whatever we think of 
the phenomenal analysis of some physical concepts, there is no reason why all physical concepts must 
be so analysed. There can be concepts of matter, space and time with entirely non-phenomenal 
application conditions, which apply on the basis of what physical properties are instantiated. In that 
case, we can use these non-phenomenally analysed concepts to describe the tails, and to formulate the 
structured tails problem.  
Another problem with this response is that it hides the tails problem behind the mind-body problem. 
There is no independent reason for supposing that density level is relevant to conscious experience. 
So this proposal is only tenable because we just don't know what physical properties determine 
conscious experience (the mind-body problem). If we can exploit the possibilities left open by the 
mind-body problem then it is not clear why spontaneous collapses should be postulated in the first 
place: just go back to the textbook theory, treat consciousness (rather than measurement) as the cause 
of collapse, blame any vagueness or incompleteness in this theory on the mind-body problem, and let 
that be the end of it. 
5.5 Lewis' response 
Lewis (2007: sec. 6) focuses on the structured tails problem and takes issue with the conclusion drawn 
here, that GRW is Everett-in-disguise. Lewis argues that the structured tails problem presupposes the 
correctness of the Everettian analysis of macroscopic superpositions (Wallace 2010). So the GRW 
advocate can simply say that because the Everett interpretation is false (e.g. due to the probability 
problem) the GRW ontology should not be interpreted in the Everettian manner.  
When Wallace (2003, 2010) defends the claim that worlds are determined by decohering wave-
function branches he appeals to Dennett's criterion: "A macro-object is a pattern, and the existence of 
a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness [...] of the theories which admit that pattern in their 
ontology" (2003: 93). Thus, since there is a pattern resembling a measuring device in both the 'in' and 
'out' components, both components contain measuring devices. According to Lewis, GRW need only 
reject this criterion: 
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 "The GRW theory [...] requires rejecting Dennett's criterion, since macro-objects are 
 essentially tied to a particular kind of microphysical structure, namely high-amplitude 
 structure. [...] But since the many-worlds theory also violates apparently obvious principles, 
 the violation of Dennett's criterion is not in itself a reason to exclude the GRW theory from 
 the set of solutions to the measurement problem." (Lewis 2007: 800). 
In response: the conditional formulation of the structured tails problem dispels the claim that the 
formulation relies on Dennett's criterion. The premises of the argument that underlie our formulation 
are so minimal that we don't even assume that the collapse centre determines macro-existence. It is 
worth considering this point in detail.  
If X determines Y then Y supervenes on X. By definition, if Y supervenes on X then there can be no 
changes in Y without changes in X. But there can still be changes in X without changes in Y. To 
illustrate: if a table supervenes on a classical particle configuration, then for the table to cease to exist 
there must be changes in the particles, but the table remains if one component particle ceases to exist. 
How many component particles must cease to be for the table to cease to be? The matter is 
indeterminate. But if we set aside problems arising from indeterminate or borderline cases (which 
need not concern us here) what we can say is that if two classical particle configurations are 
sufficiently isomorphic then if either configuration determines a table then both determine tables. 
More generally, if two elements of the fundamental ontology exhibit sufficient structural isomorphism 
then, if either determines a macro-structure then both determine structurally isomorphic macro-
structures. From this supervenience principle we can construct our argument: 
(i) If the collapse centre and the tails exhibit sufficient structural isomorphism then, if the 
collapse centre (or the tails) determines a macro-structure then the collapse centre and the 
tails determine structurally isomorphic macro-structures. [Supervenience principle] 
(ii) If it is not the case that mod-square values explain differences in the macro-structures then the 
collapse centre and the tails exhibit sufficient structural isomorphism. [Explanation as our 
guide to supervenience] 
(iii) It is not the case that mod-square values explain differences in the macro-structures. [From 
sections 5.1 - 5.4] 
(iv) Hence, if the collapse centre (or the tails) determines a macro-structure then the collapse 
centre and the tails determine structurally isomorphic macro-structures. [From (i), (ii), & (iii)] 
Like (i), (ii) is a very weak assumption: it simply assumes that mod-square values should explain why 
the tails don't determine macro-structures; otherwise we have no reason to believe that they make a 
difference to what supervenes on the GRW ontology. This is neutral on whether such an explanation 
consists in showing that the tails do or do not contain patterns that resemble familiar macro-structures. 
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The survey from 5.1 to 5.4 strongly suggests that mod-square values fail to explain the relevant 
differences.  
To derive (iv) we do not assume the Everett interpretation, or Dennett's criterion, or for that matter 
any criterion for illuminating supervenience relations. Indeed, at this stage we cannot even conclude 
that GRW determines any macro-structure let alone a multiverse structure. For that we must borrow a 
principle from GRW: 
(v) The collapse centre determines a macro-structure. [GRW principle] 
(vi) Hence, the collapse centre and the tails determine structurally isomorphic macro-structures. 
[From (iv) & (v)] 
So if we grant GRW premise (v) then from quite minimal assumptions we can conclude that the GRW 
ontology is indistinguishable from Everett's.  
The authors discussed from 5.1 to 5.4 would reject (iii). This enables them to deny the consequent of 
(ii). But Lewis does not take this route. Lewis wants to reject Dennett's criterion, but Dennett's 
criterion could only be relevant to (v) and rejecting (v) would amount to rejecting GRW. Lewis 
presumably would also not reject (i) since he poses no objection to the idea of supervenience, and 
implicitly relies on it with his phrase "essentially tied to". That leaves premise (ii).  
Lewis may hold that mod-square values determine differences in the relevant macro-structures 
without explaining those differences. But this leads to a further problem concerning Lewis' analogy 
with Everett. Lewis suggests that just as Everettians must give up the intuitive principle that 
probability requires uncertainty, GRW must give up intuitive principles. But these are disanalogous 
because there is a substantive literature attempting to make sense of the concept of probability in 
terms of decision theory so as to explain why quantum probability does not require uncertainty. Since 
we demand this from Everettians (Lewis 2010), we should also demand from GRW an equally 
rigorous explanation of how mod-square values break the structural symmetry between collapse 
centre and tails. 
A final problem is that Lewis' defence may actually pull the rug from under GRW, so to speak. For if 
we reject Dennett's criterion then we may have to deny premise (v). If macro-objects are not 
determined by the collapse centres in virtue of those centres exhibiting macro-object-like patterns, 
then why think there are any macro-objects at all in GRW? What's needed is a theory of how such 
structure comes together with high mod-square to yield macro-existence. But based on the survey 
through sections 5.1-5.4 it is not clear that any such theory is forthcoming. 
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6. Tails Problem III: The Multiverse Tails Problem 
There are surprising ethical issues that depend on a resolution to the structured tails problem. The 
GRW collapse function actually distorts the tails making the GRW ontology distinguishable from the 
Everett ontology. Wallace (2014) demonstrates that the effect of collapse on the tail peak of a particle 
is to displace it towards the collapse centre. This can be seen by considering an equally weighted 
position superposition of two separated Gaussians (localised around positions x and y respectively). 
The collapse essentially multiplies this function by another Gaussian centred on (say) x. The effect on 
the Gaussian centred on y is not only to reduce it (to a tail) but to bring it closer to the Gaussian 
centred on x (the collapse centre). If the tail determines an atom then there will probably be atomic 
excitation. After some calculations of the effects of this Wallace concludes that radiation in the tails 
will increase to unhealthy levels:  
 "With overwhelmingly high probability, agents will either observe quantum statistics very 
 close to the averages predicted by quantum mechanics, or in due course die of radiation 
 sickness." (2014: 4) 
If this result is correct it motivates a slight revision to the formulation of the structured tails problem: 
The Multiverse Tails Problem: If the collapse centre structure determines a particle 
configuration, then so do the structures in the tails. This is because the tails and the collapse 
centre are structurally isomorphic (or at least relevantly structurally similar). Nothing about 
low mod-square value can suppress this isomorphic structure. The consequence is a possible 
many-worlds ontology.  
The only difference here is italicised: we have replaced "Everett ontology" with "a possible many-
worlds ontology". The idea is that the resulting ontology resembles a merely conceivable many-
worlds ontology in which most worlds become overwhelmed with radiation. If this ontology is correct 
then one must consider the ethical implications of performing measurements that would generate such 
tails.
13
 Despite their ultimate fate there are still measurement outcomes in the tails and so there is still 
sufficient conflict with the proposition that GRW aims to explain (C). This is the superior formulation 
of the most severe tails problem for GRW's Gaussian collapse function.  
 
7. Tails Problem IV: The Tails Dilemma 
                                                          
13
 In Everett there are also branches containing lethal radiation doses, though not necessarily as a direct result of 
our choices to perform measurements. Assuming the decision-theoretic arguments work Everettians are justified 
in ignoring these branches as improbable. This might suggest a way out for GRW: embrace the decision-
theoretic arguments. But this would make collapses superfluous. 
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A very different, and seldom explored response, reformulates the collapse function to kill off the 
multiverse tails before they emerge. This would require a compact support collapse function that 
retains the peak of the Gaussian (with its 10
-5
m width) but avoids the tails. This function would 
transform (4) by eliminating all of its components except those within (say) 10
-5
m of the collapse 
centre.  
According to Lewis (1995) and Ghirardi (2011) compact support functions would not violate energy 
conservation in empirically disconfirmed ways. But regarding the tails problem, both papers argue 
that compact support functions fail to solve the bare tails problem (since position superpositions are 
guaranteed infinitely fast given collapse). Consequently both deny the need for compact support 
functions. But the tails problem at issue should be the multiverse tails problem. 
Compact support collapse functions solve the multiverse tails problem as follows. Begin with a 
system described by (1). The system will likely never make it to (2) and if it does only for a fraction 
of a second. A particle's wave-function will undergo spontaneous collapse, localising all of the 
amplitude for every particle that composes the pointer, to within the region in which the pointer gives 
a definite result. The wave-function will instantaneously spread out to infinity. But these "tails" have 
no interesting structure and as soon as they build structure through entanglement a spontaneous 
collapse will occur again. Multiverses never get the chance to be created and the multiverse tails 
problem cannot arise.  
But all is not well. For failing to solve the bare tails problem is not the only reason that collapse 
theorists reject compact support functions. To be taken seriously, collapse theories should be 
reconciled with relativity. The traditional challenge is that the collapse process apparently requires a 
preferred notion of distant simultaneity. While this challenge has arguably been addressed,
14
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support functions introduce new challenges. I finish by outlining two such challenges. 
The first comes from Pearle's (1997) discussion of the relativisation of his continuous spontaneous 
localistation (CSL) model. Pearle describes CSL's evolution equation (1997: sec. 4) which involves a 
term for the field that the state vector evolves under, which is crucial for the possibility of Lorentz 
transformations. Pearle then describes how tails are also essential for these transformations: 
 "I want to give one more reason for tails: I can't see how to make a relativistic theory without 
 them. If you have a tail, no matter how small, and you know the field which the state vector 
 evolved under, you can run the evolution equation backwards and recover the statevector at 
 any earlier time. If on the other hand, the tail was completely cut off, you get a nonsensical 
 irrelevant earlier statevector. [...] One can go to another reference frame, and in doing so the 
                                                          
14
 See Myrvold (2002). Bedingham (2011) and Simpson (2011) offer relativistic dynamical collapse theories.  
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 frame sweeps backwards in time. I cannot see how you could get sensible results in another 
 Lorentz frame without having the tail to tell you how to do it." (Pearle 1997: sec. 5.3). 
The first challenge is therefore to show how one could possibly move between reference frames when 
the tails are being continually severed. The second challenge stems from the work of Hegerfeldt 
(1974, 1998), who argues that compact support localisation violates Einstein causality:  
 "If a particle were initially strictly localized in some region on earth and if there were a 
 nonzero probability to observe the particle a fraction of a second later on the moon, this could 
 be used for the absolute synchronization of clocks [...] if all systems were spread out over all 
 space to begin with, then no problems would arise." (1998: sec. 4) 
From the positivity of the Hamiltonian alone one can prove that tails are acquired infinitely fast if they 
are somehow destroyed even for a moment. This holds in relativistic quantum mechanics too. In their 
response to Hegerfeldt, Barat and Kimball (2003) clarify the formal structure of Hegerfeldt's theorem: 
 "Hegerfeldt's theorem is an "if...then" statement, and since the "then" part (immediate infinite 
 tails) is nonsensical physics, we conclude that the "if" part of the theorem (localized wave 
 functions) should not be realizable for a sound quantum theory. Thus Hegerfeldt's theorem 
 really means that a logically consistent single-particle quantum theory should not allow 
 localization." (2003: 110) 
Another way to reach essentially the same conclusion is via the Reeh-Schlieder theorem, which 
entails that no state with bounded energy is an eigenstate of any observable associated with a bounded 
spacetime region (Haag 1996: theorem 5.3.2). Our fourth formulation of the tails problem is therefore 
the dilemma: 
The Tails Dilemma: The collapse function is either formulated using a Gaussian collapse 
function that retains structured tails or a non-Gaussian (compact support) collapse function 
that eliminates them. Gaussian collapse functions are undermined by the multiverse tails 
problem. Non-Gaussian collapse functions are potentially undermined by the additional 
relativistic problems they give rise to. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Dynamical collapse theories that postulate Gaussian collapse functions are inadequate: they fail to 
explain determinate measurement outcomes (proposition (C)). In particular, such theories postulate 
that determinate measurement outcomes are grounded in particular structures within the wave-
function (or associated matter-density). But the problem is that the wave-function (or the matter-
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density) is replete with similar structures. GRW therefore require a symmetry breaker to distinguish 
the favoured structures from the unfavoured structures. But the only relevant differences between 
them are their mod-square values, and there is no account that explains how such values could be the 
symmetry breakers. Collapse theories can be salvaged with compact support collapse functions, but 
then the additional relativistic problems need to be addressed. 
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